الفهرس | Only 14 pages are availabe for public view |
Abstract This study investigates whether corporate governance impacts the disclosure of key audit matters (KAMs) in the expanded audit report. Using a sample of 9,434 firm-year observations of Chinese listed firms spanning the 2016-2019 period, we document that CEO duality prompts auditors to disclose KAMs in terms of the number and length of disclosure of KAMs. On the contrary, the independence of the supervisory board is less likely to motivate auditors to increase the number or length of disclosure of KAMs. We also document that as managerial ownership increases, auditors provide more details about KAMs, while the number of KAMs decreases with increasing concentrated ownership. In a further analysis, our results reveal that CEO duality and managerial ownership are positively related to the disclosure of account-level KAMs. Conversely, the size and the independence of the supervisory board are negatively associated with the disclosure of account-level KAMs. Furthermore, we find that the independence of the board of directors and the supervisory board size are positively related to the disclosure of entity-level KAMs, while managerial ownership and concentrated ownership are negatively associated with the disclosure of entity-level KAMs. However, we do not find an effect of institutional and foreign ownership on the disclosure of KAMs. Overall, the evidence indicates that strong corporate governance, particularly the internal mechanisms in the two-tier corporate governance system, affects auditors’ professional judgment, thus impacting the disclosure of KAMs. |