الفهرس 
Chapter 1: Framework of the ResearchOnly 14 pages are availabe for public view
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Abstract
This research proposes a model that investigates the joint effect of corporate governance quality and risk disclosure quality on information asymmetry. The researcher employs a structural equation modelling (SEM), on a sample of Egyptian listed banks during 2011–2017, to test the proposed model including all the simultaneous relationships among variables of interest. The findings show that corporate governance quality and risk disclosure quality have a significant and negative joint effect on information asymmetry. However, the structural equation modelling shows that the indirect effect of corporate governance quality on information asymmetry, through risk disclosure quality only, is stronger than the direct effect of corporate governance quality on information asymmetry. This result suggests that effective corporate governance mechanisms are necessary to enhance the quality of risk-related information disclosed, which in turn reduce information asymmetry among market participants. Even though earnings quality has been incorporated as a mediating variable within the proposed model, this does not change the fact that the indirect effect of corporate governance quality on information asymmetry, through risk disclosure quality only, dominates other indirect effects of corporate governance quality on information asymmetry, through earnings quality only and through both risk disclosure quality and earnings quality sequentially. Interestingly, the findings reveal that corporate governance quality and risk disclosure quality have a significant positive joint effect on earnings quality. However, the structural equation modelling reveals that the direct effect of corporate governance quality on earnings quality is more powerful than the indirect effect of corporate governance quality on earnings quality, through risk disclosure quality. This result suggests that effective corporate governance mechanisms could directly yield the favourable effect by curbing earnings management practices committed by banks’ managers. This research is distinguished by validating the proposed model that has been overlooked by prior studies.